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Abstract
That the study of the first-person reports of intentional actions, happenings, thoughts, 
and sensations as revealing the structure of self-consciousness was a central theme of Ans-
combe’s work in philosophy of mind has not been sufficiently registered in the literature. 
I aim to show that this theme animated many of her works throughout her writing career 
and her “The First Person” (1974) can be best understood as one of these works and in 
the light of others.
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Resum. Quin problema hi ha amb “Baldy”? Un enfocament no referencial radical de “jo”
Que l’estudi dels informes de primera persona d’accions intencionals, esdeveniments, pen-
saments i sensacions com a reveladors de l’estructura de l’autoconsciència va ser un tema 
central del treball d’Anscombe en filosofia de la ment és quelcom que no ha estat prou 
considerat en la literatura sobre el tema. El meu objectiu és mostrar que aquest tema va 
animar moltes de les seves obres al llarg de la seva carrera com a filòsofa i que el seu «The 
first person» (1974) pot entendre’s millor com una d’aquestes obres i tenint-ne en compte 
d’altres.
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The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.
Tractatus 5.631
Introduction
In “The First Person” (from now on “TFP”), as the title makes no secret, 
Anscombe discusses some of the peculiar features of the first-person pronoun. 
She defends a, notoriously false according to many commentators,1 view that 
“I” does not refer. Even for the most sympathetic readers of Anscombe who 
find many insights in TFP,2 the conclusion is at best a confusion or a reflection 
of her special, narrow use of the notion of reference. The commentators most-
ly focus on two arguments they take Anscombe to give to establish this con-
clusion and show that they are not good arguments. I will call them “Argu-
ment from Immunity to Error Through Misidentification” and “Anti-Cartesian 
Argument”. If we see TFP as part of a project of understanding self-conscious-
ness and its structural distinctness from consciousness, and “I”’s role in 
expressing self-consciousness and its peculiarities as revealing the structure of 
the thoughts it is used to express as the main subject of TFP, this change 
of focus will provide a much better reading of TFP. According to this read-
ing, the passages on which the commentators based their arguments will 
gain a different significance and turn out not to be intended as direct argu-
ments for her claim that “I” does not refer. And once we understand what 
is at stake in her insistence that “I” does not refer in the light of her other 
works, the conclusion will start to look much more palatable, too. In what 
follows I will motivate such a reading. 
But first let me briefly mention these two arguments that are attributed to 
Anscombe and how they are dismissed in the literature. For some thoughts of 
the form A is B, my way of knowing that something is B leaves no room for 
a mistake in identifying what is B. Hence if I know through this way that 
something is B then I am entitled to the thought that A is B. Hence my 
thought A is B is immune to error through misidentification3 of whatever is this 
thing which is B. Anscombe observes in TFP that the judgments of the form 
“I am B” have such immunity. In first-person judgments one does not iden-
tify the object she is among other objects, and since there is no identification, 
there is no room for misidentification. As she puts the point: “Getting hold 
of the wrong object is excluded…”4 The commentators take Anscombe to 
conclude from this that “I” cannot be a referring expression as she holds that 
1. Inwagen (2001), Evans (1982), Peacocke (2008). 
2. McDowell (1998), Campbell (2012), Stainton (2019).
3. This is a term coined by Shoemaker (1968). Neither Anscombe nor Wittgenstein used this 
term to make their respective points. The term “The immunity to error through misiden-
tification” (from now on IETM) became the common currency in the discussions of both 
Wittgenstein’s and Anscombe’s views on this issue. For brevity’s sake I will use it as well. 
4. Anscombe (1975: 32). 
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there can be no reference without identification. This is what I call Argument 
from IETM. The standard objection to this argument is to mention indexicals 
and thereby show the possibility of a form of reference which is identifica-
tion-free. So the objection reveals Anscombe’s mistake: She fails to notice the 
forms of reference which are identification-free. 
The Anti-Cartesian Argument is a modus tollens. Anscombe’s intricate expo-
sition has been summarized as an argument with two premises: 1. If “I” refers, 
then it must refer to Cartesian Ego. 2. Cartesian Ego is not suitable as the ref-
erent of “I”.5 Therefore, “I” does not refer. As Anscombe herself notes,6 the 
rejection of the idea of a Cartesian Ego is extremely common among analytic 
philosophers. So the objections mainly target Premise 1. The way to reject Prem-
ise 1 is to find ways in which “I” can refer to a living human being, or a person 
in the forensic sense. John McDowell’s version which uses an idea from P.F. 
Strawson is the most insightful one of this type of objection that I came across. 
He takes Anscombe to assume that when there is an I-thought, the object to 
which “I” refers must be identifiable within the way in which the subject enter-
tains this thought. Hence Premise 1 would be true only on “the assumption that 
a referring role for “I” would need to be fully accountable for within [the think-
er’s] stream of consciousness.”7 But the thinker’s grasp of the use of “I” requires 
her to appreciate that she is also an object among others, available in the public 
realm – which is a fact to which I will also appeal below to account for the 
communicative uses of “I”. As long as the link between the stream of conscious-
ness and the thinker’s thoughts about the object she is not severed, we can exploit 
the tools for identifying that object to settle the referent of the identification-free 
thoughts. Hence the question “who am I?” need not be settled within the stream 
of consciousness. But if that is so, “I” can refer to an ordinary object, and not 
necessarily to Cartesian Ego. That is, we can reject Premise 1. 
I will not tackle these objections head-on, but rather try to show that 
Anscombe did not take the premises of the above-mentioned arguments as 
conclusive reasons for her claim that “I” does not refer. These remarks should 
not be taken as conclusive arguments to that end. What makes the use of “I” 
the subject of inquiry for Anscombe is its unique role: expression of self-con-
sciousness. In so far as “I” expresses self-consciousness, it cannot be expressing 
a thought about an object. This is the claim I take her to be defending in TFP. 
Self-conscious thought is not object-directed thought, that is self-conscious-
ness is not a species of consciousness-of. She argues for this claim in two steps. 
5. Why is Cartesian Ego not a suitable referent for “I”? Some commentators, Descombes for 
example, took Anscombe to maintain that Cartesian Ego does not exist. The text shows 
that this cannot be Anscombe’s reason: “If the principle of human rational life in E.A. is a 
soul (which perhaps can survive E.A., perhaps again animate E.A.) that is not the reference 
of “I”.” (Anscombe, 1975: 35) Since the commentators that take Anscombe to give an 
anti-cartesian argument here do not focus on this premise, I will not say more on this here. 
We will come back to this below when we discuss Anscombe’s metaphysician.
6. Anscombe (1979: 3). 
7. McDowell (1998: 192).
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When we take “I” as nothing but a name that everyone uses for herself, we 
cannot make sense of its role as expression of self-consciousness. That is, a 
special form of referring is not what makes “I” an expression of self-conscious-
ness. This is the first step and the point of the A-users example. Moreover, 
even if we use a characteristically referring expression to express self-conscious-
ness, in so far as it is an expression of self-consciousness it must be expressing a 
thought which is subjectless. This is the second step and the point of the Baldy 
example. Hence for Anscombe an expression cannot play the roles of referring 
and expressing self-consciousness at the same time. If we do not see this, we end 
up in a false view of what self-consciousness is. If I am right that this is the main 
axis of her paper, then we should not take any of her remarks as giving argu-
ments for her claim “I” does not refer independent of “I”’s role as an expres-
sion of self-consciousness. Whether an expression of self-consciousness can 
play this role while referring is the question she answers negatively. 
My reading takes A-users and Baldy examples as central. Just as in Inten-
tion,8 Anscombe relies at least as heavily on examples to make her points as 
on the explicitly argumentative parts of her text. Although some pay attention 
to these parts of the text, these two examples and especially Baldy have not 
received much scrutiny, to say the least. In Part I, I will focus on the Baldy 
example and try to get clear on an essential expression Anscombe uses to 
characterize self-conscious thought: “unmediated agent-or-patient conceptions 
of actions, happenings, and states”. In Part II, I will draw on her other writ-
ings, namely “The Subjectivity of Sensation” (1976) and An Introduction to 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959) to make good on my claims and provide the 
larger philosophical context in which the discussion of “I” as the expression 
of self-consciousness should be taken. 
Part I: Baldy 
There is a mistake that it is very easy to make here. It is that of supposing that 
the difference of self-consciousness, the difference that I have tried to bring 
before your minds as that between “I”-users and “A”-users, is a private expe-
rience. That there is this asymmetry about “I”: for the hearer or reader it is in 
principle no different from “A”; for the speaker or thinker, the “I”-saying subject, 
it is different. Now this is not so: the difference between “I”-users and “A”-users 
would be perceptible to observers. To bring this out, consider the following story 
from William James. James, who insisted (rightly, if I am right) that conscious-
ness is quite distinct from self-consciousness, reproduces an instructive letter 
from a friend: “We were driving…in a wagonette; the door flew open and X, 
alias ‘Baldy’, fell out on the road. We pulled up at once, then he said ‘Did any-
one fall out?’ or ‘Who fell out?’ – I do not exactly remember the words. When 
told that Baldy fell out he said ‘Did Baldy fall out? Poor Baldy!” 
8. See Özaltun (2016) on how Anscombe uses examples in stating her views via the Builders 
example from Intention. 
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If we met people who were A-users and had no other way of speaking of 
themselves, we would notice it quite quickly, just as his companions noticed 
what was wrong with Baldy. It was not that he used his own name. That 
came afterwards. What instigated someone to give information to him in the 
form “Baldy fell out” was, I suppose, his behavior already showed the lapse of 
self-consciousness, as James called it. He had just fallen out the carriage, he 
was conscious, and had the idea that someone had fallen out of the carriage 
– or he knew that someone had, but wondered who! That was the indication 
how things were with him. 
Even if they had spoken a language without the word “I”, even if they had 
had one without any first-person inflexion, but everybody used his own name 
in his expressions of self-consciousness, even so, Baldy’s conduct would have 
had just the same significance. It wasn’t that he used “Baldy” and not “I” in 
what he said. It was that his thought of the happening, falling out of the carriage, 
was one for which he looked for a subject, his grasp of it one which required a 
subject. And that could be explained even if we did not have “I” or distinct 
first-person inflexions. He did not have what I call ‘unmediated agent-or-
patient conceptions of actions, happenings, and states’. These conceptions 
are subjectless. That is, they do not involve what is understood by a predicate 
with a distinctly conceived subject. The (deeply rooted) grammatical illusion 
of a subject is what generates all the errors which we have been considering. 
(Anscombe, 1975: 36; emphases are mine) 
This is the very last section of TFP. As we see in the very last paragraph, 
Anscombe diagnoses what is wrong with Baldy as follows: He does not have 
unmediated patient conception of his own fall. If he had such conception it 
would be subjectless. What does “subjectless” mean here? As she defines it, his 
subjectless conception of the fall would not involve what is understood by the 
predicate “fall” with a distinctly conceived subject. Now everything hinges on 
what we take the import of the phrase “distinctly conceived subject” to be. If 
we go with the pervasive analysis of first-person thought via IETM, this could 
mean that in using the predicate the thinker does not need to conceive sepa-
rately the subject of predication to which this predicate is now applied. So, in 
addition to the predicate use, there is no distinct act of identifying the subject 
of predication. In conceiving the fall, the subject that falls is already conceived. 
Nonetheless, there is a subject conceived. This is the take on unmediated 
conceptions we find in McDowell, for example: 
We must indeed insist that the conceptions exclude looking for a subject, if 
we are to keep our hold on what is special about the first-person. But even 
so, we can suppose that the conceptions require to be predicated of a subject: 
particular person each of us refers to by “I”. (McDowell, 1998: 193) 
But, as McDowell also rightly observes, Anscombe’s text calls for a dif-
ferent reading and this reading leads to a bolder claim: In unmediated con-
ceptions there is no subject being conceived, that is, there is no subject of 
predication at all. These predications are not conceptions of a subject as 
being so and so; what is understood by the predicate is not that a distinct 
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subject is so and so. So it is not that a subject is being predicated albeit with-
out an act of identification. It is not, as it were, that there was no need of 
identification because the subject was already identified in the predicate use. 
Rather, in these conceptions no subject has been identified. There is no con-
nection to the distinctively conceived subject being made, because there is no 
subject conceived in these conceptions.
In unmediated conceiving of actions, happenings, and states, one does not 
attribute them to a subject. Hence this is not an attributive use of predicates. 
Here there is no conception of a subject to whom these actions, happenings 
and states are attributed. In this non-attributive use of predicates we represent 
actions, happenings, and states differently, and in these representations there is 
no room for subject. It is because these actions, happenings and states are not 
represented as actions of/happenings to/states of an object. These representa-
tions are not object-directed: they are not representations of an object who acts, 
to whom something happens, or who has certain states. (Here I use object as a 
very general term for anything that has an enduring unity over time: it can be 
human beings, tables, chairs, selves, souls, egos, babies, animals, etc.) 
Since it is not an object-directed representation, the one who has such a 
conception would not ask “who?”. But this is not because, as the IETM inter-
pretation would have it, one must already know who, and since one knows 
who without identification, there is already an error-proof/guaranteed refer-
ence to someone. Anscombe’s point is not that this question is redundant. One 
would not ask “who?” because the question has no application at all. She 
writes, as I quoted above, that Baldy’s conduct shows a lapse of self-conscious-
ness because “…his thought of the happening, falling out of the carriage was 
one for which he looked for a subject, his grasp of it one which required a 
subject.” As I read it the problem here is not that Baldy should not have 
looked for a subject because he should already know who, but that he has a 
conception of the event, the falling out, which has room for such a question 
in the first place. That is, I take it, even if he knew he is the one who fell via 
a conception of this fall that requires a subject, such a conception of the fall 
would not be an unmediated conception of this happening. The difference 
between mediated and unmediated conceptions of the fall is not the way in 
which the subject knows who fell. A self-conscious fall is not a fall in which 
the subject comes to know who fell in a special way. The problem with Baldy 
is not that he did not know who fell in that special way, but that he could ask 
“who?” at all. Anscombe’s unmediated conceptions, then, are not just unme-
diated by identification of subject, but unmediated by any representation of 
subject.9
 9. As I said above, McDowell also observes that it is in the latter sense Anscombe takes these 
conceptions to be unmediated. But he thinks that she comes to the latter by mistakenly 
equating the former with the latter. He rightly points out that one does not single out a 
subject in unmediated conceptions establishes that there is no identification, but not that 
there is no subject of predication. However, I do not think Anscombe fails to distinguish 
these two conceptions of “unmediated”.
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But suppose, unlike Baldy, I have unmediated conception of my fall. In 
what sense is the who-question not applicable here? Surely you could ask 
“Who fell out?” and, having unmediated conception of this fall, I would reply 
“I”. Am I, on behalf of Anscombe, denying this in saying that for the unme-
diated conceptions the who-question has no application at all?10 I am not. 
Having unmediated conceptions of actions, happenings and states I can 
answer who-questions regarding these actions, happenings, and states with “I” 
if I want to answer them truthfully. So I can understand who-questions raised 
by others regarding these actions, happenings, and states because as an adult 
user of English I also understand that your mediated conception of these 
actions, happenings, and states admits this question: your consciousness of 
them is in the form of consciousness of actions, happenings, and states of an 
object and you might wonder who that object is. I can settle your questions 
with “I”. Only my unmediated conceptions do not admit the question. My 
understanding that I am an object to others and I can be an object to myself, 
does not require my unmediated conceptions of actions, happenings, and 
states to be conceptions of an object within these unmediated conceptions. 
From self-consciousness I can settle some questions that arise in someone else’s 
consciousness of my actions and states. This does not mean that the same 
questions would be applicable within self-consciousness. 
Anscombe says that she is using the Baldy example from William James to 
make a point James also makes: self-consciousness is distinct from consciousness. 
Baldy is conscious of the fall while he is not self-conscious. James’ point seems 
to be that these two states can come apart: self-consciousness is not required for 
consciousness.11 But in Anscombe the distinction is not just that we can have 
one without the other (though both the Baldy and A-users examples make this 
point as well). According to Anscombe self-consciousness and consciousness 
provide structurally distinct representations. In insisting that unmediated concep-
tions are subjectless she is rejecting the accounts which try to capture the dis-
tinctness of self-consciousness from consciousness while keeping the structure 
of these representations the same. For these views all consciousness would be 
consciousness of an object (used in a broad sense). Self-consciousness would 
10. I am grateful to Lucy Campbell for pressing this question and the discussion. 
11. See James (1890 V.I p. 273). In the passages surrounding the Baldy example James talks 
about a special sense of objectivity we find where there is lapse of subjectivity. By citing 
examples of various representations of objects where the representing subject is not repre-
sented in the representations, he is rejecting a view he attributes to many, but originally 
Kant: “…that the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function 
of the thought…a thought, in order to know a thing at all, must expressly distinguish 
between the thing and its own self.” Here the criticism is quite general and not confined 
to first-person thought. He is talking about apperception and rejects it as the condition of 
consciousness of objects in general. The interesting thing here is that James takes apper-
ception to imply that I exist and to be a thought about the thinker herself. He cites the 
Baldy case to show that when there is consciousness without self-consciousness we can see 
that “I exist” is not implied but additional to what is given in the content of consciousness. 
There is nothing about the structure of first-person thought in particular in these passages. 
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be a species of consciousness of. It would still be a consciousness of something 
being so and so but the way in which the object of consciousness – the subject 
of predication – is conceived would be special. 
She considers such a view just before she introduces the Baldy parable. 
She says that it is tempting to think that the difference is a private experience. She 
might have Frege in mind here, but anyone who speaks of “knowledge from 
inside” these days would also be in this camp. According to this tempting view, 
in self-conscious thought one is presented to oneself in a special way. We 
cannot share this special way, but we can communicate what is given by that 
special way, since what is given is still a consciousness of the object the subject 
is. Since the representations provided by this special experience and the rep-
resentations of the same person by herself or others via observation are struc-
turally the same, one might think that from the hearer’s perspective there 
would be no difference as to whether the speaker is expressing conscious or 
self-conscious thought. Both A-users and Baldy parables are meant to show 
that this is not so: the difference is noticeable by the hearer. 
If we met people who were A-users and had no other way of speaking of 
themselves, we would notice it quite quickly, just as his companions noticed 
what was wrong with Baldy. It was not that he used his own name…
Even if they had spoken a language without the word “I”, even if they 
had had one without any first-person inflexion, but everybody used his own 
name in his expression of self-consciousness, even so Baldy’s conduct would 
have had just the same significance. (Anscombe, 1975: 36) 
But of course that there is a noticeable difference is not enough to show 
that the difference is in the structure of the respective representations. Only 
in the Baldy parable do we have a clear statement of the structural difference: 
conscious representations have a subject of predication and self-conscious rep-
resentations do not. This structural difference in thought is not apparent since 
the sentences we use to express both forms of representation have the same 
subject-predicate structure. The grammatical structure of the sentences in 
which we express self-consciousness covers up this important structural differ-
ence between conscious and self-conscious representations. And with this 
thought Anscombe ends TFP: “The (deeply rooted) grammatical illusion of 
a subject is what generates all the errors which we have been considering.”
Part II: The Subject of Sensations 
This mistaken view of the structure of self-consciousness is of a piece with the 
mistaken view of our subjectivity in action, sensation, and thought. TFP ends 
with her diagnosis of the structural distinctiveness of self-conscious thought. 
The significance of this point for the objectivity of observation statements is 
exposed in another paper Anscombe wrote a year later. 
In “The Subjectivity of Sensation” Anscombe claims that if there is a 
subject in the first-person reports of what is known by observation, then we 
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cannot detach what is observed from a particular observer and we cannot 
have objective representation of how things are. If “I” in first-person reports 
refers to a particular observer, then the content of the observation statement 
would be contaminated with this particularity. Hence the price we will pay 
for holding on to the wrong conception of the structure of I-sentences is the 
loss of objectivity of observation statements. In light of Anscombe’s worry 
about the objectivity of sensation reports, it becomes clear that her infamous 
claim that “I” does not refer cannot be dismissed as a peculiar narrow mind-
edness about the notion of reference12 or a confusion of epistemology with 
semantics.13 Whether the observer represents herself with or without identi-
fication is irrelevant here, and so is what notion of reference one adopts. If 
the observer’s representation of herself is essentially involved in her sensory 
reports, however this representation might be achieved, it would have the 
same detrimental consequence for the objectivity of the report. Hence we 
cannot domesticate Anscombe’s infamous claim that “I” does not refer by 
some deflated notion of reference.14 Now let us look at how Anscombe argues 
in “The Subjectivity of Sensation”:
There remains a certain conception of ‘subjectivity’ to which I have made a 
passing reference. I spoke of the way ‘the subject’ is thought to enter essen-
tially into the sensory. The doctor, we said, may say “The reds match”, but 
the explicit statement of the case is “I see these reds to match”. If so, then a 
Platonic argument may force it on us that the ‘objective’, in the sense of what 
is the case regardless of an observer, is never sensed, but is always inference or 
construction from the sensorily given cues. What is given is always a product 
of the encounter of subject and object and so properly belongs to the encoun-
ter and the moment at which it occurs. This would be destructive of the idea 
of observation. If something is correct observation, we ought to be able to 
detach what is observed from the statement of the observer’s perception of it, 
and simply say it was so.
Now it is perfectly true to say that the explicit statement of the case is “I 
see these reds to match”, and if “I” is a name of something involved in this, 
it is difficult to see how the detachment could ever be justified. (Anscombe, 
1976: 54)
Anscombe’s thought here is that that we can move from “I see these reds 
to match” to “These reds match” shows that “I” cannot be the name of a par-
ticular subject. Or in the language of TFP, here “I see” must be expressing the 
12. Evans (1982), McDowell (1998).
13. O’Brien (1994).
14. See Botterel and Stainton (2018), and Stainton (2019). They are right of course in that for 
Anscombe “I” is not an expletive like ‘it’ in ‘It is raining’. However, this is not the only way 
in which one can conclude that, as they put it, ‘I’ must be radically non-referring. They 
give a reading of TFP that attributes to Anscombe the view that “I” has a deflated reference. 
However, nothing less than a radical non-referring “I” view would serve Anscombe’s pur-
pose. In fact, Stainton himself mentions that the Baldy passages poses a challenge to his 
reading. 
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doctor’s unmediated conception of her sensory state of seeing that reds match. 
The doctor is in a self-conscious sensory state of seeing which is her conscious-
ness of matching reds. For her consciousness of matching reds to be an objec-
tive representation that the reds match, her representation of the sensory state 
that provides this content should not be a representation of herself-as-repre-
senting-that-the-reds-match. A representation of a certain subject, oneself or 
another, as seeing that something is the case, cannot be a direct representation 
of something being the case. When someone, I or otherwise, is attributed a 
sensory experience, nothing about what the reality is like has been said yet. If 
“I see these red match” is an expression of a conception of sensory state as 
mediated by representation of oneself as seeing these reds match, then one can 
only infer that the reds match by something like the inference to the best 
explanation of one’s own sensory states. Hence, if “I see these reds to match” 
will be the expression of a direct objective judgment that these reds match, then 
this sensory judgment cannot be a judgment about the sensory experience of 
a particular subject. 
This is not to deny that whenever there is a sensory experience there is a 
subject of this experience. However, in order for the thought to be objective, 
what is thought through this experience should not be contaminated with 
the representation of that subject. In “I see these reds to match” no reference 
to a particular subject has been made. Here “I see” specifies that “these reds 
match” is a perceptual judgment; that it is a seeing-that. But perceptual judg-
ments are not statements about the sensory experiences of a particular subject, 
not even one’s own. Otherwise they cannot be objective judgments about 
how things are. 
Here we can see the full force of the claim that the who-question is not 
applicable to the first-person reports of sensory judgments. When the ques-
tion is applicable, these reports cannot express objective content. Although 
not explicitly mentioned in TFP, this point about the possibility of the objec-
tive content is the source and main motivation of the infamous claim that 
“I” does not refer, and reading TFP in this light will demystify her insistence 
on the radically non-referring view. This would also explain why Anscombe 
in “The Subjectivity of Sensation”, right after the above cited passages, gives 
a two-page recapitulation of TFP. Here she recalls the position of the insen-
sitive logician character we find in TFP: “‘I’ is a proper name, albeit of a 
rather special sort”. Then, just as she does in TFP, she contrasts this position 
with the more sensitive metaphysician’s philosophical idea of “the subject”, 
and ends the paper by rejecting both views as inadequate in capturing the 
essentially first-person character of sensation reports: 
While we must reject the ‘insensitive logician’s view of “I”, nevertheless this 
opposite one is no better. The essentially first-person character of the sensory 
report must be granted, but it does not introduce any such thing as ‘the sub-
ject’ is conceived to be. It does not introduce any thing at all, precisely because 
“I” is not any kind of name. (Anscombe, 1976: 56; emphasis is original)
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When we appreciate that the main motivation for the non-referring view 
is the problem of objectivity of thought, we can also see why only the logician is 
deemed insensitive, although the metaphysician’s view is also rejected. To what 
exactly is the logician insensitive? The logician is missing what is special about 
the “I” of the Cogito. One such logician is Saul Kripke. Anscombe criticizes 
him in TFP (p. 21) for not seeing the essentially first-personal nature of the 
Cogito argument. The logician is taken to be Arthur Prior in the literature,15 
but I think it is meant to be the name of a type: someone who does not see the 
truth behind the philosophical idea of subject and misses what is puzzling about 
the “I” of the Cogito. In dismissing the logician she is also emphasizing what is 
true in the philosophical idea of ‘the subject’: 
We may put it like this: there is no path from “I” to the person whereby he 
connects it with an object (the person that he is) which it names. This is the 
principal root of the philosophic idea of ‘the subject’ – that “I” does not stand 
for any object, not for anything presented. Or, as Berkeley put it, there is no 
‘idea’ of the self.” (Anscombe, 1976: 55)
So the debate is as follows: the logician thinks that “I” is the representation 
of an ordinary object but this representation is not a presentation. The meta-
physician on the other hand insists that “I” does not represent anything that 
can be presented. So “I” cannot be a name of some ordinary object. In that, 
Anscombe agrees with the metaphysician. But does “I” represent something 
else – something that in principle cannot be presented but to which all pres-
entations are made – as Anscombe puts it, not an ordinary sort of object but 
an extraordinary one? Anscombe mentions the move of metaphysician from 
the thought that “I” stands for no ordinary object to the thought that “I” 
stands for an extra-ordinary object disapprovingly but nevertheless with sym-
pathy. She uses the phrase “it is difficult to avoid the idea…” to introduce this 
move in order to emphasize its natural appeal. The logician, on the other hand, 
gets no sympathy and is called “insensitive”. He gets no sympathy because he 
does not appreciate the genuine difficulty in accounting for the “I” of the 
Cogito, that is, for objective representation in general to be possible, “I” can-
not be the name of something presented. 
It seems to me most of the literature on TFP is also insensitive to this diffi-
culty with which Anscombe was occupied long before and after she wrote TFP. 
The radically non-referring view of TFP must be seen as part of her ongoing 
investigation of subjective and objective aspects of experience which comes up 
in her writings predating TFP and postdating “The Subjectivity of Sensation.” 
In An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959, p. 166) she writes: 
It is fairly natural thought that ‘where there is consciousness, there is an I’; but 
this raises immediate questions about ‘consciousness’, and about the legitimacy 
of speaking of ‘an I’.
15. See, for example, Descombes (2010). 
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Notice how similar this is to what we have seen above in “The Subjectivi-
ty of Sensation” – to wit: “where there is sensory experience there is a subject 
of experience, and it raises issues about the content of those experiences” – and 
she had written this seventeen years earlier!
Already in 1959, then, Anscombe concludes that it is illegitimate to talk of 
an I, because for consciousness to represent the world as it is, this I which must 
be there whenever there is consciousness cannot have any particular attributes, 
hence it cannot be an I among many. In speaking of the contents of conscious-
ness, with the use of “I” we add nothing to the contents of consciousness. 
Rather “I” is used to say something about how the contents of consciousness are 
considered: one does not come to know these contents by mediation of verbal 
and non-verbal behavior of oneself or others. One knows “from inside”. But we 
need to be careful with this spatial metaphor: from inside is not a particular 
point of view I can take towards the contents of my consciousness. To warn us 
against interpreting “from inside” this way Anscombe writes: “But there is no 
other point of view.”16 So in considering these contents from inside I do not 
represent the contents of consciousness from a particular point of view as 
opposed to some other point of view. The use of “I” is not meant to represent a 
particular, perhaps privileged or somehow special, point of view, but the direct 
availability of these contents and consequently the direct availability of the 
world. Particular points of view would be represented by mediation of the rep-
resentations of the particularities (location, perspective, position, etc.) of repre-
senting subjects. By contrast, “from inside” is used to specify a representation 
such that in its content there is no room for the particularities of the subject: 
from inside one does not see the subject, but just what the subject sees. From inside, 
the subject has unmediated conception of her sensory states, that is, these 
conceptions are not contaminated with the representation of the subject. It is 
in this sense these conceptions of those states are subjectless and that is why 
these states provide objective representations of the world.
But the ‘I’ of this way of talking is not something that can be found as a mind 
or soul, a subject of consciousness, one among others; there is no such thing to 
be ‘found’ as the subject of consciousness in this sense. All that can be found is 
what consciousness is of, the contents of consciousness…the world described 
by this language is just the real world… (Anscombe, 1959: 168)
But then it is also not legitimate to talk about the I. As all that can be found 
is the content of consciousness. Hence, we can see that the condition of my 
representations to be directly of the world as it is, is what makes the talk of an 
I illegitimate: from inside is not from a particular point of view. If “I” is some-
thing, whatever kind of thing that is, it would be one among, at least possibly, 
many. A representation of someone among many would not have a direct 
claim to reality. 
16. Anscombe (1959: 166; emphasis is original).
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Conclusion
We do not have linguistic structures to specifically express consciously being 
in a state or consciously being a patient or agent of an event, rather than 
being conscious of someone (oneself or another) being in a state or being an 
agent or patient of an event. We use “I” to express the former in the linguistic 
forms that reflect the structure of the latter. When we do not see that and take 
the linguistic form to reflect the form of self-consciousness, we mistake 
self-consciousness to be a form of consciousness-of-an-object (ordinary or 
extraordinary). In characterizing self-consciousness as “having unmediated 
agent-patient conceptions of states and events” Anscombe points to the struc-
ture of self-consciousness as distinct from the consciousness of an object. 
“Unmediatedness” is not to be understood as criterionless identification of the 
object of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not an object-directed rep-
resentation, it is not a consciousness-of, so it is not mediated by a representa-
tion of an object, and it is in this sense unmediated. In having a representation 
of his own fall that requires a subject, that is, a representation that admits the 
question “who?”, Baldy’s awareness of this fall is a consciousness-of; his con-
ception of his fall is a mediated one. Even if he expresses this conception with 
“I” instead of “Baldy” or “someone”, it would not be an expression of self-con-
sciousness. His use of “I” would still stand for an object that fell, like a wolf 
in sheep’s clothing. The use of “I” is the mark of self-consciousness when we 
use it to express unmediated conceptions, and such a conception of this fall is 
exactly what Baldy is lacking. 
What Baldy lacks is essential to our subjectivity. It is the kind of subjectiv-
ity whose vehicles are subjectless; the kind of subjectivity that makes objective 
representation possible. The subject of action, thought and sensation is not an 
ordinary object, such as a human being, but not a special object either, such as 
self, soul, ego, etc.; it is not an object. The difficulty of having a conception of 
our subjectivity which is not falling under one of these two horns is the diffi-
culty of having a non-reductive account of self-consciousness without giving 
up what is true in naïve realism. Since “Self-consciousness is not…nonsense. 
It is something real, though as yet unexplained, which “I”-users have…”,17 
Anscombe is facing this difficulty by inquiring into the peculiarities of “I” as 
the expression of self-consciousness, over the course of several works, one of 
which is TFP. We can do justice to TFP only if we keep this context in view.18
17. Anscombe (1975: 26).
18. I conducted most of the research that informed this paper during my research leaves when 
I visited Warwick Mind and Action Research Center. I presented earlier versions of these 
ideas there in two different talks, first in 2017 and later in 2019. I would like to thank 
everyone in the audience for their invaluable input. I especially benefitted from the discus-
sions with Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, Lucy Campbell and Naomi Eilan. I also 
would like express my gratitude to Hemdat Lerman and Sofia Miguens for unceasing 
support and encouragement. 
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